Recent post-revolution states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have all descended into either illiberalism as is the case of Tunisia; full autocratic rule as is the case of Egypt; or civil war and anarchy as is the case of Libya, Syria and Yemen. Sudan is on a trajectory to join any of these groups, though it is still not clear which category it will end up in.
How did we get here?
It was not long ago that popular uprisings broke up in parts of the MENA region, with various regimes being toppled by angry citizens who had endured decades of autocratic rule with corruption, unemployment and heavy state repression as the order of the day. As the regimes began collapsing, many people across the globe began to wonder what government would emerge in place of the voids created by collapse of those regimes.
Many in the West predicted a democratic avalanche across the MENA region, with new rulers emerging to create institutions that would foster the growth of democracy. Suffice it to say, those dreams have been dashed. Revolutions are supposed to birth change – the direction of that change is, however, not always certain. The change canvassed for in all the post-Arab Spring countries seems to have resulted in utter disillusionment if not outright tragedy.
Sudan, a nation whose post-independence history has been the story of two civil wars, sectarian conflicts and decades of strongman rule, has joined the list of North African and Middle East nations destined for an uncertain future.
In 2019, young Sudanese after almost three decades of corruption, conflicts and unemployment had finally had enough. They rallied and eventually, with support from the military, forced the government of President Omar al-Bashir out of power. A new government – composed of the Sudanese military, a paramilitary force and civilians – was set up to pave the way for transitioning to a stable democratic administration. The military, accustomed to always having their way, two years on forced out the civilian government.
The country then came under the rule of General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese military, as leader of government; and General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo who goes by the moniker Hemedti, leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as Vice. Two years later, these two generals are battling for leadership of their country – pitching the trained Sudanese army against the over-150,000 battle-hardened fighters of the Rapid Support Forces. Whoever wins this battle will determine the country’s direction.
Another democratic disillusionment
What explains this consistent disillusionment of democratic development in the Middle East and North African region? There may be several reasons, but in this write-up I will expatiate on three key factors.
First, it is common knowledge that established monarchies in the MENA region hardly have any interest in seeing the establishment of thriving democracies in their backyard. Many would rather have similar forms of government around them. Take the case of Egypt. The Mubarak regime’s fall in Egypt caused so much angst among Arab monarchies. Many Arab rulers are reported to have berated the Obama administration for failing to support the Mubarak regime following the outbreak of mass demonstrations against the regime.
Following General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s overthrow of the Morsi government, Saudi Arabia and the UAE among others pledged about US$12billion to prop-up the el-Sisi government. This massive support achieved two objectives. It stabilised the el-Sisi government, which helped it kill the nascent democratic experiment that had just started in Egypt with the election of an Islamist-leaning Morsi government; and also ensured a strongman ruler again took control of Egypt.
The deliberate and systematic destruction of established institutions and the building of personality cults with vast patronage systems by rulers of the MENA region equally account for the failure of democratic rule in the region.
The MENA region sure is a complicated region for policy analysts. The distinguished Singaporean diplomat and scholar, Kishore Mahbubani – in his book Has the West Lost It? – wondered whether it is the “result of bad luck? Poor leadership? Flawed societies and cultures? Or Western meddling?” which account for the failure of some states in the region.
One noticeable trend, though, is that many rulers in the MENA region – rather than building strong institutions to champion the citizenry’s cause and keep leadership in check, instead built personality cults around themselves; with vast patronage networks supported by the state’s wealth. Institutions such as the judiciary, media and civil society organisations are deliberately weakened. Individuals and groups owe their positions of power and wealth to their loyalty to the ruler and not to any dint of hard work or competence. Critics of the government are silenced by any means possible.
Those who do not have access to these rulers do not receive a proportional share of the national cake. The weakening of institutions means that rulers who succeed them maintain those established patronage systems and other flawed systems of governance. To this end, there are no thriving independent civil society organisations or think-tanks in that region. The media is heavily censored, with the judiciary and other organs of state under sole control of the rulers.
Finally, the role of non-state actors also accounts for this democratic regression. Some MENA rulers are propped-up by feared non-state actors. Many countries within the MENA region are familiar with non-state actors. Rulers use them to suppress dissent and carry out other unpleasant duties they might otherwise have used the regular army for. Some of these non-state actors get rewarded with lucrative contracts and mining rights. A textbook example of this is the feared Wagner Group currently active in Ukraine, Mali and Libya, and reported to be one of the external parties presently playing some role, albeit from the margins, in the current Sudan conflict.
The conflict is at its nascent stage – for now, and it may well fade out due to mediation by external multilateral bodies such as the UN among others. It could also degenerate into a regional conflagration, drawing in countries such as Egypt, Chad and Ethiopia among others. Time is running out to act.
As it stands, Sudan is on the same trajectory as the other MENA countries mentioned in my introduction. The two generals fighting for control of their country will plunge their country into another conflict, or probably a civil war. Whoever emerges as winner of this conflict will tighten the screws around the country. It will not be a pleasant ending; there may be more bloodshed, and a battle-hardened autocrat might eventually emerge victorious to head the Sudanese government.
Ghanaians can learn a lesson or two from this, though – that there is a need to strengthen our democratic institutions and make them robust to fight individual rulers. Americans have a myriad of problems, for sure, but the Trump administration stressed-tested American institutions: and now those same institutions are still the reason why America is still America today. I pray Ghana and other African countries can learn this lesson.
>>>The writer loves Geopolitics. He can be reached via [email protected]
