By Jacob AZAARE (PhD)
An experienced based ratemaking in auto insurance, Bonus Malus System (BMS), was introduced as an alternative to individual credibility model developed by Bühlmann in 1967. It was popularized by Lemaire as the best alternative for individual credibility models since they were not easy to use in practice (2).
BMS also known as penalty-reward system (3), is basically employed in the insurance industry to improve fairness by charging each individual insured/policyholder a premium proportional to his or her representative risk (4, 5).
This system of insurance pricing is used to penalize policyholders by either charging higher or reduced insurance premium based on their post data (6). Furthermore, insurers adapt BMS to signal policyholders to be careful on the road and also, ensures that policyholders who are cautious are compensated with rewards and those who are reckless are penalized.
Thus, Bonus are given to cautious drivers and Malus are issued out to policyholders who are reckless on the road (4, 7). Moreover BMS seeks to improve safety and fairness between the insurer and the insured based on claims history (6, 8).
In developed countries, BMS encourages safety on the road for policyholders as they get to understand that their future premiums depend on the number of claims they report. Further, it enhances customer retention in the various insurance policies as policyholders see it as fair and transparent (8).
In developing countries like Ghana, BMS could potentially be an effective pricing strategy, as it incentivizes customer enrollment by making premiums directly dependent on the frequency and severity of their claims (9).
Strategically, BMS reduces the reporting of false and minor claims (10), because the insured understands that frequent minor accidents lead to a proportional increase in their premium. Thus, BMS ensures a seamless transition of policyholders from one premium level to another based on the number of reported claims (7, 12).
Generally, BMS seeks to reward bonus to policyholders who are cautious by reducing their premiums while penalizing those who are reckless with malus by increasing their premiums (4). This consequently leads to the High Bonus Hunger Effect (HBHE), where policyholders tend not to report minor claims to minimize cost. Thus, policyholders decide not to report minor claims and self-insure claims to enjoy lesser premium cost (bonus) (11).
As (13) posits, Bonus Hunger Effect also known as “Thirst for Bonus”, is about linking the cost of pending claims to the cost of future premium. Implying that, policyholders in effect, bear the cost of minor claims to avoid higher premiums and so will not report claims if the amount is less than the future premium 14).
Economically, BMS has a significant influence on the finances of insurers, insureds and the economy at large.
The BMS With higher Hunger Effect is a determinant of the volume of financial flows between the insured and the insurer, as it directly influences how much premium to be paid and how much claims to be paid.
To insurers, HBHE reduces the administrative cost in processing and paying minor claims and increases short-term profits because there are no or few claims to pay (12, 16). Contrary, HBHE saves policyholders from paying higher premium and sends signal of caution to improve safety on the roads in order to maintain their bonuses on premium charges (11).
Also, it makes insurers more financially solvent; however, it might be quite challenging to determine the exact risk level of policyholders, which is likely to result in an underestimation of premium. The effect of this phenomenon is on both the insurers and the insureds, as they have an interdependent relationship; that is, the outcome from either directly influences the other (7, 12, 13).
When minor claims are not reported, an insurer’s short-term profit increases, while the insured’s trade-off is a lower premium or bonuses. However, insurers might adjust future premiums which could lead to inappropriate pricing (16). Moreover, changes in the driving behaviors of the insured influences how insurance is priced and the profits insurers make (8).
In Ghana, like in most developing countries, the auto insurance pricing system relies solely on risk factors, which have little or no direct effect on cautioning policyholders to drive more safely (18). The insurance premiums are determined by classical factors such as the vehicle’s age, cubic capacity, nature/type, and usage, along with the driver’s age, gender etc., (16, 17). These parameters used in determining premium do not give any inference as to how careful policyholders are on the road.
Moreover, these traditional risk factors do not take into consideration the claims history of individual policyholders and thus, they are neither rewarded for being cautious nor punished for being reckless in traffic (17).
As postulated by (3,12), BMS reduces the financial burden on insurers by lowering the cost of claims processing, as fewer claims are reported when BMS particularly the one with higher hunger effect is employed. Additionally, insurers retain funds that should be used for claims payment and use them for other investment activities and transactions, increasing their financial stability (15).
In summary, with innovation and more equitable methods, the dynamics of auto insurance ratemaking are constantly evolving and hence, Ghana like other developing countries needs to embrace BMS in order to fully maximize its ability of making insurance policies optimal, increase transparency, reducing false and fake claims and the possibilities of encouraging safe driving (1, 12).
More also, when insureds are being cautious, the administrative costs for insurers are reduced, which also helps reduce the number of traffic accidents (11, 16, 17). Consequently, this increases the workforce as insurers’ capacity to expand operations is enhanced due to their enhanced financial solvency, resulting from reduced administrative costs and claims payments, thereby significantly contributing to the growth of the economy.
References:
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-  Azaare, J., Zhao, W., and Ahia, B. N. K. (2022). Exploring the Effects of Classical Insurance Rating Variables on Premium Auto in ARDL: Is the high Policyholder’s Premium in Ghana Justified? SAGE Open, 12(4). https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440221134219.
 
Author:                                                    
Jacob Azaare (PhD), Management Science and Engineering,
Senior Lecturer, Department of Business Computing, School of Computing and Information Sciences, C. K. Tedam University of Technology and Applied Science, Navrongo             
-short biographical statement:
Jacob Azaare holds a PhD in Management Science and Engineering, as well as a Master’s in Management Science and Engineering, both from the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China. Jacob has a strong background in teaching and has a multidisciplinary research interests, including Financial Modelling and Insurance, Data Analytics, Financial Risk Management, Digital Marketing and E-governance.