By Terry Mante MANTE
“Ghana’s constitutional architecture must serve the people, not just the political class.”
Ghana’s 1992 Constitution has been the foundation of our democracy for over three decades, shaping governance, leadership, and national development. While it has provided stability, certain provisions require revision to ensure greater efficiency, accountability, and responsiveness to contemporary governance needs.
As we celebrate another year of independence, it is time to critically examine aspects of our constitutional framework that need reform to enhance our democratic system and promote national progress. This letter to Ghana calls for a paradigm shift in our constitutional architecture by addressing the following key areas:
- Abolishing the Council of State
The Council of State was conceived as a body to offer advice to the President, providing wisdom and checks on executive power. However, Article 91 of the 1992 Constitution explicitly states that the President is not bound by its advice, allowing him to seek counsel from any other sources. This makes the Council largely redundant and an unnecessary financial burden on the state.
The Supreme Court case Asare v. Attorney-General [2016] GHASC 43 interpreted the meaning of “advice” within Ghana’s constitutional framework, affirming that the President is not legally required to follow the Council’s recommendations. If an institution exists solely to provide advice that can be ignored without consequence, then its continued existence should be reconsidered in favor of more effective governance mechanisms, such as strengthening parliamentary oversight and engaging technocratic advisory committees.
Further, Article 92(3) of the 1992 Constitution mandates the Council of State to conduct its deliberations in camera, meaning its discussions and recommendations are not open to public scrutiny. This lack of transparency undermines accountability, as citizens have no way of assessing the quality of advice given to the President or whether their interests are being adequately represented.
A democratic system thrives on openness, and institutions that wield influence over governance should be subject to public oversight. If the Council of State operates in secrecy without enforceable influence over executive decisions, its relevance in a modern democracy becomes increasingly questionable.
- Assigning the Vice President a direct ministerial role
Currently, the Vice President’s role is largely ceremonial unless delegated by the President. Article 60(1) of the 1992 Constitution establishes the Vice President as the principal assistant to the President but does not assign any specific executive responsibilities. This creates a situation where the nation’s second-in-command has no direct impact on governance outside of representation duties.
To maximize national leadership, the Vice President should be assigned a specific ministry to oversee. This will ensure that the office is functionally relevant beyond election cycles, fostering greater accountability and efficiency in governance.
- Electing MMDCEs on a partisan basis
One of the greatest constraints on institutional independence in Ghana is the excessive appointive power of the President. Article 243(1) of the 1992 Constitution gives the President the power to appoint MMDCEs (Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Chief Executives), limiting local governance autonomy and fostering political patronage.
Instead of presidential appointments, MMDCEs should be elected directly by the citizens on a partisan political basis, with provisions allowing independent candidates to contest. This will enhance democratic participation, strengthen local governance, and ensure that MMDCEs are accountable to the people they serve rather than the central government.
By shifting to an electoral system, Ghana can foster greater responsiveness and efficiency in local governance. If this proposal were to be adopted, there should be legislation that clearly delineates the functions and powers of central government and local government to avoid overlapping responsibilities and ensure effective decentralization.
- The role of deputy ministers
Ghana’s government structure includes numerous deputy ministers, yet their roles are often ambiguous, and they wield little real authority. Article 79(1) of the 1992 Constitution provides for the appointment of deputy ministers to assist ministers in the performance of their duties.
However, in practice, these deputies do not have independent decision-making powers, as their functions are ultimately controlled by substantive ministers. In many cases, they merely act as intermediaries, adding layers of bureaucracy that slow down governance rather than enhancing efficiency. Eliminating the role of deputy ministers would streamline government operations, reduce expenditure, and encourage efficiency by strengthening the responsibilities of substantive ministers and their technocratic teams.
Finally
As we reflect on our national progress, it is imperative that we adjust the frameworks that govern us to align with the principles of accountability, efficiency, and inclusivity. Ghana’s constitutional architecture must serve the people, not just the political class. A nation’s growth is measured not just by its economic gains but also by the strength of its governance structures.
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About the author
Terry Mante is a thought leader whose expression as an author, corporate trainer, management consultant, and speaker provides challenge and inspiration to add value to organizations and position individuals to function effectively. He is the Principal Consultant of Terry Mante Exchange (TMX). Connect with him on LinkedIn, Facebook, X, Instagram, Threads and TikTok @terrymante and www.terrymante.org.
