GoldBod: The GHS 22bn that never left the building
Features

GoldBod: The GHS 22bn that never left the building

The headline says Ghana lost GHS 22 billion on gold in 2025. That is an accounting figure. The economic question, what the country actually gave up, has a smaller and more flattering answer.

Awuni Prosper Ayinbilla & Dr Stephen Lartey
Published August 25, 20265 min read

Much of the public argument over the gold programme has been conducted in the wrong currency. The figure everyone quotes, a loss of over US$1.7 billion or about GHS 22 billion under the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme, is an accounting number.

Published by Juliet Etefe
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Barbara ZeluAUGUST 27, 2026

I like the fact that you juxtaposed the costs of the domestic gold purchase programme against conventional borrowing. That comparison makes sense and suggests that the latter is starkly more expensive. My only concern is that, now that GoldBod has taken over the operational responsibility for domestic gold purchases and sales from the Bank of Ghana, any future losses arising from its operations will presumably be recorded on and borne through GoldBod's balance sheet. So, what concrete measures are being put in place to minimise these losses going forward? Otherwise, a year from now, we may simply be having the same debate again except this time about losses sitting elsewhere in the public sector rather than on the Bank of Ghana's balance sheet.

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